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ABSTRACT
Although past research has emphasized the importance of international environmental
agreements in redressing environmental degradation, systematic assessments of regime
effects are missing. The central focus of this paper is assessing the effectiveness of
international environmental agreements: do international environmental agreements
actually improve environmental quality? Most of the research in the field of
environmental protection has focused on the role of economic development and the
political system. Several studies have found that the relationship between a countries
wealth and some pollutants follow an inverted U-shaped curve, popularly known in the
literature as the Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC). Again scholars have also found
that democratic countries have better environmental records compared to authoritarian
polities.
Using generalized least squares on a panel data set consisting of sixty six countries
who were members of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, for a time
period of ten years (1991-2000), I found that international environmental agreements
exert significant influence in ensuring environmental quality. Most importantly,
industrialized countries, who are again members of UNFCCC under the Annex 1
category, tend to emit less. Similarly, economic development and a democratic polity
also help in ameliorating environmental condition. Therefore, one can conclude that
institutions do matter, even if they are non-binding, in bringing about desired changes.

vi

INTRODUCTION
Despite the paucity of judicial means of dispute resolutions and the ongoing pursuit of
developing countries to alleviate their economic conditions, international agreements
have been established in increasing numbers in the area of environmental protection. The
rapid proliferation of international environmental agreements has led most analysts to
focus on their formulation, negotiation and content. Yet little empirical analysis of the
effectiveness of these environmental accords has been done so far.
The central focus of this paper is the effectiveness of these agreements: simply, do
international environmental agreements actually improve environmental quality?
Effectiveness is defined as the degree to which international environmental accords lead
to changes in behavior that helps to solve environmental problem (Victor, Raustiala &
Skolnikoff 1998). However, effectiveness does not imply getting rid of the problem
altogether.
This question is interesting because all international regimes face problems with free
riders, holdouts and defectors, this is even more so for environmental regimes.
Regulation seems to entail large and visible short-term costs to entrenched business
interests. It is also viewed as discriminating between rich and poor countries. The
benefits are often widely dispersed in time and space, and it is often fairly easy for an
actor to extract them without accepting the burdens of compliance.
Agreements for environmental protection in the contemporary context constitute a type
of “soft and functional regimes” (Sands 1993) directed at the control of behavior by states
that generally does not present an overt threat to the neighbors. Rather, the principal
danger is one of everyday social or economic activity presenting risks within the state in
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which it originates, to that states’ neighbors and possibly, to the global commons. This is
typically the activity’s externalities rather than any intent to cause harm or encroach on
neighbor’s territory that is the cause of concern. Combating environmental problems,
therefore, requires coordination amongst the states. In nearly every case, states have
organized their responses to transboundary environmental problems through international
agreements. The current generation of research, therefore, aims at assessing the
effectiveness of these agreements, because as Zürn (1998: 649) concludes in a major
review of international environmental policy, regime effectiveness has become the
driving force in the analysis of international relations. In this study, I assess the
effectiveness of the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention in Climate Change
(UNFCCC hereafter) for reducing cardon di-oxide (CO2) emissions in sixty six countries.
Research so far on ensuring environmental performance has concentrated largely on
the role of economic development. A plethora of studies have found that the relationship
between a country’s wealth and some pollutants follow an inverted U-shaped curve,
popularly known in the literature as the Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC henceforth).
Besides being rich, democracies fair better as compared to authoritarian countries in
environmental quality. However, systematic analyses of effectiveness of international
agreements in ameliorating environmental conditions are missing.
To the end of assessing the role of international multilateral agreements in ensuring
environmental performance this paper consists of an empirical analysis of the
effectiveness of the UNFCCC in sixty six nations, which are currently parties of the
Convention for a ten year period (1991-2000). The next section consists of an overview
of the relevant literature in this field, followed by a discussion of the research design used
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in this paper. The final section of the paper consists of the interpretation of the findings
from the empirical analysis. I conclude this paper by reiterating my argument that
participation in international agreements facilitates the process of protecting one’s
environment from further degradation.
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LITERATURE REVIEW
Substantive Debates on Effectiveness of Agreements
International regimes, broadly, are defined as “principles, norms, rules and decision
making procedures around which actors expectations converge in a given issue area”
(Krasner 1983: 1-2). States create institutions as a means of achieving collective
objectives that could not be achieved acting unilaterally. Either directly through
international agreements, or through the act of an existing international institution, states
establish the new institution’s purpose, the scope of its powers and the shape and
functions of its organ. Moreover, international agreements orient and coordinate the
behavior of states and ultimately of enterprises, non-governmental organizations,
individuals, steering behaviors away from activities that are environmentally destructive
and towards those that are environmentally benign.
International agreements are, in general, referred to as the governance structures
surrounding international conventions and treaties, including norms, rules, principles, and
decision-making procedures as well as numerous actors who bring those components to
life (Mitchell 2002: 61). Actors, both state and non-state are viewed as complex entities,
not simply unitary maximizers (Young; 1972). The main objective of these agreements is
to guarantee compliance with established rules, norms and standards and policies in the
absence of a world government.
It is generally argued that most of the states and other actors comply with most
international laws (Bull 1977). The predictions of Hobbesians notwithstanding, one can
observe a considerable degree of compliance on the part of the actors. Young (1979: 3134) argues that compliance in a decentralized system can result from self-interest
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calculations, fear of reprisals by another actor, felt obligation and socialization into a
system of rules. Over time expectations converge around sets of rules.
Simmons (1998) further elaborates the reasons as to why countries comply with
international agreements. According to the rationalist school of thought, international
reputation, opportunities of reciprocity and political legitimacy can be considered as
some of the reasons why states accede to particular international agreements. Again, the
scholars in the domestic legalist school look at distinctive domestic regimes that tend to
bind them into a “zone of law” in the conduct of their foreign relations. Consequently, we
can assume that the reduction in pollution or reduction in trade in endangered species that
we observe is due to several factors, like international agreements.
The last few decades have witnessed a noticeable proliferation of international
environmental agreements, as well as growing concern in the academy and policy making
circles. The first wave of research in this area was concerned about understanding the
conditions under which international environmental agreements were likely to arise
(Keohane, Haas and Levy 1993; Sprinz and Vaahoranta 1994; Young 1994). The next
generation of research focused on ensuring the implementation of and compliance with
these international environmental agreements (Barrett 1994; Jänicke and Weidner 1997;
Weiss and Jacobson 1998). At present the scholars in this research program have become
more concerned about the actual outcome of these international environmental
agreements; i.e. whether or not these agreements have been effective.
The effectiveness of an environmental agreement is a function of how strong the
agreements are in terms of the key provisions aimed at addressing an environmental
threat, how seriously states implement those provisions, and how amenable to pressure
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the states are. Ringquist and Kostadinova (2005: 87) point out that addressing
environmental problems effectively requires (a) increased governmental concern
regarding the issue; (b) contracts between the national and international levels regarding
monitoring and credible commitments; and (c) governing capacity necessary to change
policy. International environmental agreements can produce all of these by generating
and disseminating scientific research, creating monitoring networks, and the generation
of public pressure. However, amongst the current researchers of international institutions
there has been a growing skepticism about the actual effectiveness of these environmental
agreements (Helm and Sprinz 2000). Nonetheless, in today’s world of increasing
international economic integration and liberalization, one cannot lose sight of the impact
of international institutions.
Studies surrounding environmental protection have mostly emphasized the role of
domestic factors, especially economic development in ameliorating environmental
conditions. Several scholars have argued that economic growth leads to environmental
protection and preservation. The Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC) hypothesis
proposes that there is an inverted U-shaped relation between the various indicators of
environmental degradation and income per capita.1 This implies that economic growth
will eventually redress the environmental impacts of the early stages of economic growth
and that will, in turn, lead to further environmental improvements in developed countries.
Scholars in this research area are unanimous about the fact that economic growth is
necessary in order for environmental quality to be maintained or improved.
1

This is an essential part of the sustainable development argument as put forward by the World
Commission on Environment and Development (1987) in Our Common Future. The EKC is named after
Simon Kuznets (1955) who hypothesized that the relationship between a measure of inequality in the
distribution of income and the level of income is an inverted U-shape curve.
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Grossman and Krueger (1995) and Shafik and Bandyopadhyay (1992) find that after a
country’s GDP per capita is recorded at around $ 8000, environmental quality is typically
seen to improve. Therefore, it is a generally held belief that, even though environmental
conditions deteriorate in the initial stages when the economy is growing, environmental
condition is expected to improve after a certain point in the growth trajectory (HoltzEakin and Selden 1995; Roberts and Grimes 1997). Nonetheless, the hypotheses deduced
from the Kuznets curve logic have been largely debated (Arrow et. al 1995; Stern,
Common and Barbier 1996; List and Gallet 1999; Perman and Stern 2003). Particularly,
Harbaugh, Levinson and Wilson (2001) argue that very little empirical support exists for
the inverted U-shaped pattern in the relationship between several important air pollutant
and national income. Therefore, although there does exist some relationship between
economic growth and environmental improvement, it cannot be generalized under all
conditions and for all countries alike – one size does not fit all.
Especially for CO2, the pollutant responsible for global warming, effective price is far
from optimal and this pollutant appears to have a monotonic EKC. Also the elasticity of
substitution is probably lower and apparent damage is less evident to the regular
consumers, both implying a higher turning point in the curve. Traditionally work done in
the field of EKC has used longitudinal data with very few control variables, in order to
estimate the net impact of income on environmental quality. This has been highly
criticized by scholars like Arrow et al. (1995: 92) who observe that “while these studies
do indicate that economic growth may be associated with improvements in some
environmental indicators, they imply neither economic growth is sufficient to induce
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environmental improvement in general, nor that the environmental effects of growth can
be ignored”.
It has been observed that several of the least developed countries also have become
parties to many international environmental accords. This is so because as Bernauer
(1995) points out, these institutions as sets of international regulations and organizations
that are intentionally established by preexisting actors (states) through explicit, legally or
politically binding, international agreements in order to regulate anthropogenic sources of
negative externalities affecting the natural environment. As evident, despite economic
hurdles, countries deliberately become party to international agreements and comply with
them also.
Besides economic development, another domestic factor that is expected to have
profound impact on environmental conditions is the type of political system. In a recent
study, Waldhoff (2005) shows that domestic regime type has a serious impact on the
turning point of the EKC. Waldhoff finds that for democractic countries the turning point
is around $ 20,000- 30,000, which rises substantially to $153,000 for autocratic countries.
However, it is difficult to find much work done assessing the effects of international
environmental agreements in inducing the countries to improve their relative
environmental performance. This paper attempts to analyze the effect of UNFCCC,
which was concluded and opened for signature in 1992 at the Rio Summit, on CO2
emissions, which are the most threatening of all Greenhouse gases.
Methodological Debates
The question about the effect of institutions is also a center of a broader debate of
international relations theory. Several studies have suggested that international
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institutions can have an independent effect on progress in environmental protection under
some circumstances (Sand 1990, 1992). These studies further suggest that empirical
research, guided by good theory can prove to be a productive way to assess the effect of
environmental institution.
While estimating the effectiveness of international agreements scholars have faced
difficulty is separating out the effects arising out of the regimes itself and those arising
out of other factors (Young 2001). Indicators of environmental quality are affected by a
number of variables that are independent of these agreements.
International agreements are as effective as parties make them. Weiss and Jacobson
identify four factors that affect the effectiveness of an international agreement: (i)
characteristics of the activity; (ii) characteristics of the accord; (iii) international
environment, and (iv) domestic factors specific to the country (Weiss and Jacobson 1998:
5-7). In this paper, I concentrate on the international and domestic factors for assessing
the effectiveness of UNFCCC. The first two factors mentioned by Weiss and Jacobson
are left for future research.
In general, effectiveness of these international agreements is analyzed based upon its
success at achieving the goals that led to its creation. For example, Helm and Sprinz
(1999) have proposed defining effectiveness as the amount of progress induced by the
regime toward a regime’s collective optimum from a no-regime outcome. On the
contrary, Miles and Underdal (2001: 4) attack this argument by using case studies to
assess effectiveness on different scales (ranging from 0-4 for behavioral change and 1-3
for environmental improvement) and then normalizing them to a range from 0-1. Both
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approaches produce a common metric of effectiveness ranging from no improvement
relative to no-regime outcome to full achievement of the collective optimum.
Underdal (2002) further argues that effectiveness of international environmental
agreements is a product of the interaction of problem malignancy and the institutional
setting created to address the problem. While the core element of problem malignancy is
the extent to which rational action of the individual states produces a suboptimal outcome
for all. The essence of institutional setting lies in its capacity, or the ability of these
institutions to generate resources, establish rules and goals without unanimity among
participants, and enforce the terms of the agreements. Regimes that address difficult
problems with low levels of institutional capacity would be less effective and vice versa.
The malignant environmental problem addressed in this paper is global warming due to
excess emission of carbon-dioxide (CO2). The international environmental institution
developed to take care of this problem was United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 1992 at the Earth Summit. Researchers in the EKC
program argue that CO2 has a monotonic EKC. Holtz-Eakin and Selden (1995) estimate
quadratic EKCs for CO2 on panel data showing the very high turning points for this
pollutant. They project that the global CO2 emissions growth continues at a 1.8 per cent
per annum for the foreseeable future. This is so because output and population will grow
most rapidly in low-income countries with a high marginal propensity to emit. Given
such a pessimistic picture one wonders whether there has been or can be any effect of the
UNFCCC for these low- income countries. International environmental institutions may
be effective in changing this picture.
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The conceptualization of institutional effectiveness varies immensely. According to
Jacobeit (1998: 300) many scholars have focused on political variables, including those
in the economic political domain by Keohane et al. or legal political domain by Victor,
and others. Underdal (1997) conceptualizes regime effectiveness as environmental
problem solving in terms of relative improvements in counterfactual state of affairs, i.e.,
the absence of an international regime and in terms of improvement relative to a collective
optimum. This criterion evaluates relative progress in environmental protection against
the baseline of a world without the institution. This had been the most popular measure
used to operationalize regime effectiveness (Helm and Sprinz 1999). Therefore, in this
paper attempt has been made to use a measure of regime effectiveness that captures the
change brought over from a world without the agreement to a world with the agreement
in place, i.e. how much success have been achieved.
.
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RESEARCH DESIGN
Dependent Variable
The dependent variable I am trying to explain is effectiveness of the climate change
regime. According to Mitchell (2002) a dependent variable so designed needs to capture
both aspects of success, i. e. how much change the regime/ agreement induced and how
hard the change was to induce. As it is difficult to get usable information on the cost
required to induce change of behavior, I concentrate on the first aspect of success: how
much change the agreement induced. In line with Zürn (1998) and Jacobeit (1998), both
of whom regard emission-based approaches to the measurement of international regime
effectiveness as promising, I would operationalise the dependent variable as the
percentage change of CO2 emission in each of the sixty-six countries, which are party to
UNFCCC, from 1991-2000, compared to the base year 1990 (refer to Appendix I for
more detailed discussion of the variables and Appendix II for the name of countries and
their year of ratification).
In order to correctly assess regime effectiveness the model should consist of essentially
three elements: policy factors, external environmental factors, and national capacity and
development factors (Ringquist and Kostadinova 2005: 93; Weiss and Jacobson 1998).
UNFCCC required that upon ratification committed signatories' governments should
move towards a voluntary "non-binding aim" to reduce atmospheric concentrations of
greenhouse gases with the goal of "preventing dangerous anthropogenic interference with
Earth's climate system." These actions were aimed primarily at industrialized countries,
with the intention of stabilizing their emissions of greenhouse gases at 1990 levels by the
year 2000; and other responsibilities would be incumbent upon all UNFCCC parties
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(UNFCCC 1992). Since not all the signatories ratified the Convention at the same time, a
model was devised to measure the relative progress made in signatory states before and
after ratification. Moreover, percentage reduction of emissions is considered to be a better
measure for assessing the impact of environmental agreement, as measuring only the
absolute differences would not reveal a very clear picture.
Regressing this dependent variable on a set of independent and control variables
including at least one agreement-related variable, would then allow using the regression
co-efficient (b) on agreement-related variable as a metric of effectiveness of that
agreement that would be comparable across the unit of analysis (Mitchell 2002).
I had to restrict my sample to sixty-six countries due to non-availability of data for all
the 189 countries who are currently member of the UNFCCC. Data for the total CO2
emission for the entire sample was taken from World Development Indicators 2004.2
Independent and Control Variables
The above discussion delineates the chief explanatory variable of this study, i.e.
membership in international environmental institutions (Memit membership in UNFCCC
for country i in year t). Besides testing the hypothesis that international agreements are
effective in ameliorating environmental conditions, this intuitively also helps us to
evaluate the theory that holds that regimes only influence the behavior of those states
legally bound by a given rule. This variable is coded as 1 for the countryi the year after
that country ratifies UNFCCC and 0 for the period prior to that. Conventional wisdom
guides us that there would be passage of some time after which a noticeable impact of the
agreement on a country’s environmental performance can be noticed. Therefore, another
2

East and Central European countries have been not included due to non-availability of data for the years
under study. Moreover, most of these countries were under transition during this time period. Including
these countries could have skewed the results.
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important independent variable would be membership counter coded as 0 up to the year a
country ratifies the Convention and the number of years it had been a party up until 2000.
This would help to capture the trend effect (Lewis-Beck1986). If our assumption is
correct then the coefficients for the membership counter variable should show a negative
sign, implying: (i) countries when member to an international agreement would perform
better, i. e. reduce CO2 emission; and (ii) longer they are member of the agreement an
improvement can be observed in their performance. Moreover, a time counter variable is
also included, coded as1 through 10 for each country. This is another way to see the
direction of a country’s performance over time.
Young (2001) pointed out that conceptualizing the no-regime outcome in terms of
interactive decision-making among self interested states leads us to focus only on policy
games themselves and to neglect a number of other driving forces –– demographic,
economic and technological – that interact to produce important environmental impact.
Therefore, GDP per capita (GDPit) of these countries in all the years is included as the
control variable. This would also help us to evaluate national capacity of the countries
included. Data on this variable is also taken from the World Development Indicators
2004. As the relationship between income and environmental quality is assumed to be
curvilinear a squared term of the GDP per capita is also included. If EKC truly holds for
CO2 emissions, then the coefficient of the former should be positive, while for the latter
or the squared term should be negative indicating that pollution rises in the initial phase
of economic growth, eventually reaching a plateau and then decreasing.
Another measure of national capacity can be economic growth of a country. There are
two competing hypotheses in this area (Jahn 1998): on the one hand, countries with high
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economic growth would be better equipped to combat environmental pollution. On the
other hand, rich countries have higher levels of consumption, which can further lead to
environmental degradation. In order to check the validity of these hypotheses a second
model is used including economic growth.
The countries included in the study are divided into two groups under the Framework
Convention – Annex I and non Annex (UNFCCC 1992). The Annex I countries are the
economically and technologically advanced countries for whom it was mandatory to
reduce their emissions to 1990 level by 2000. Therefore, the study includes another
independent variable called Annex, coded as 1 for the Annex I countries and 0 otherwise.
If economic improvement begets better environmental performance, then Annex should
be negatively related to the dependent variable. As it is already assumed by many
scholars that industrialized or Annex I countries would perform better, an interaction
term is also included with membership. If the assumptions so far hold true that developed
countries have better environment, then we can expect that the interaction term would be
negatively related to the dependent variable implying the industrialized, rich nations emit
less.
Other control variables that follow from the theory are share of industry in the
country’s GDP, percentage of urban population, and type of political system (Waldhoff
2005). Including these variables ensures some amount of control over the domestic and
external environment (Ringquist and Kostadinova 2005: 93). Percentage of industry in a
country’s GDP measures industrial activity, which can be a potential source of excessive
pollution. This variable should be positively related to CO2 emissions. However, this
measure for industrial activity does not account for energy efficiency, i. e. reducing use
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of coal and fossil fuel, which are the principal emitters of CO2. Nonetheless becoming
energy efficient is an important tactic employed by the countries to reduce CO2
emissions. Hence, coal and fossil fuel consumption can be considered endogenous to
Convention ratification. Data for this variable has been taken from the World
Development Indicators 2004.
Again there exist substantial amount of literature claiming that political factors, like
political stability, democratic polity, have a bearing on the environmental quality of the
nation (Jänicke 1992; Sprinz 1998; Waldhoff 2005). Waldhoff (2005) argues that coupled
with wealth of a nation, democratic polity, along with its free press and presence of
various interest groups, has had good effect in reducing pollution. The polity variable in
the study is a measure of how democratic a country is on a scale of -10 to +10. Data has
been taken from POLITY IV project (refer to appendix I). This variable presumably
should show negative relation with the dependent variable implying lower scores on the
scale means poor environmental quality.
Much can be said about urban population. Environmentalists have for a long time
debated the role of urban sprawl in the developed countries. With the growing wave of
economic liberalization, this has now become a characteristic of developing nations also.
Growing urban population is definitely a precondition of growing environmental
pollution. Hence, this variable should be positively related to the pollution levels. Again,
political economists like Barro (1998) argue that urbanization is one of the indicators of a
country’s economic development. As already mentioned, one of the assumptions in this
paper is that industrialized country pollute less, we can expect that high percentage of
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urban population would imply less emission. Data for this variable is also available from
the World Development Indicators 2004.
Generalized least squares on a panel data for sixty six countries for ten years have been
applied on the following model:
Yit = α + β` Xit + Ut + εit
Where, Yit = Percentage of CO2 emissions compared to 1990 as the base year;
Xit = Matrix of all independent variables;
Ui = Random disturbances characterizing the i th observation and is constant
through time.3

3

Fixed effects model was not included due to technical problems.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics

Variable

Obs

Mean

Std. Dev

Min

Max

DV

660

.344

.502

-.455

4.913

Mem

660

.598

.490

0

1

Mem_Counter

660

2.169

2.293

0

8

Annex

660

.318

.466

0

1

Interaction

660

.2060

.404

0

1

GDP
percapita
GDP pc – sq

660

7593

10561

135.01

44798.75

660

1.69e+08

3.54e+08

18227.81

2.01e+09

Pop

660

54.73

23.19

5.31

97.33

Industry

660

29.54

7.91

9.22

53.54

Polity

659

6.27

5.69

-9

10

GDP growth

660

-.186

2.850

-14.89

26.35

Time_counter

660

5.5

2.87

1

10
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RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
Table 2 and 3 reports results, coefficients, Z scores and standard errors (in parentheses),
for the full sample of sixty-six countries.
Table 2 shows that membership in the UNFCCC has significant impact on
environmental quality. The memberships counter variable shows that pollution or
emission have a decreasing trend over the years and is highly significant. As
hypothesized, the longer that countries are member of the environmental agreement, the
better they perform. Figure 1 further substantiates that after UNFCCC came into place in
1992, there has been a visible change in the emission patterns of the countries in the
sample. Around 1990-92, the percentage of CO2 emission, as compared to 1990, was
clustered around -0.5 and + 0.5. But with the passage of time, there developed two
separate clusters of countries. Although the time counter variable is positively and
significantly related to the dependent variable implying the emissions increase
considerably with the passage of time, we can conclude that the presence of an effective
environmental agreement would mitigate that result.
The environmental performance of a country is further improved by its economic
development. As the coefficient on the Annex variable show in table 1, that it
significantly matters whether or not a country is in the Annex 1 category or not; Annex 1
being the group of developed, industrialized countries. Moreover, looking at the
interaction term one can clearly say that a country which is industrialized and also a
member of the international agreement like UNFCCC would definitely perform better
compared to developing or non Annex 1 countries.
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0

percentage of CO2 emissions
1
2
3
4

5

Percentage change in CO2 emissions compared to the bade year 1990

1990

1992

1994

1996

1998

time

Figure 1: Percentage change in CO2 emissions compared to base year 1990
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2000

Table 2: Effect of UNFCCC on CO2 emissions for all countries
1991-2000

Variables

Co-efficients

z

.129
(.06)
-.033
(.016)

2.14**

Membership
Membership counter

-2.00**

Control Variables- International Regime Effect
Annex
Membership *
Annex
Time counter

-.182
(.065)
-.315
(.072)

-2.78**
-4.32***

.082
(.013)

5.87***

9.31e-06
(8.75e-06)
-2.09e-11
(1.73e-10)
-.001
(.0013)
3.79e-08
(9.39e-08)
.0007
(.0021)
-.008
(.0037)
.084
(.087)

1.06

Domestic Regime Effects
GDP percapita
GDP percap-sq
Urban Population
GDP percapita*Pop
Industry
Polity
Constant

*** p< .01; ** p<.05; *p<.1
N = 659
Wald χ2 = 285.55***
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-1.21
-1.75*
0.40
0.34
-2.17**
0.97

The above-mentioned argument, in part, supports the EKC hypothesis. Although, GDP
per capita and its square terms individually does not reach statistical significance, further
analysis show that these variables are jointly significant. A likelihood ratio test between
the unrestricted and restricted (dropping GDP per capita and its square) models yield
highly significant test statistic. This implies that with increase in GDP per capita a
country would initially experience an increase in pollution, which eventually reaches a
plateau and then starts phasing out. Intuitively, this result reveals that after a nation has
met its subsistence requirements, it would become more concerned about the
environment. However, the argument made in this paper should be treated as a
complement to the EKC assumption. Improving national capacity can definitely help in
ameliorating environmental degradation. Similarly, participation in international
environmental agreements can further accelerate the process.
Besides membership and economic development, some of the other variables also show
interesting results. For example, percentage of urban population is negative and
significant. Contrary to what environmentalists argued, urban sprawl is seen to reduce
pollution for all the countries. One explanation for this finding is that urbanization is
largely related to modernization and development (Barro 1998). So when we see that a
large percentage of people live in urban area, one assumes that the country is developed
to some extent and is slowly becoming energy efficient.
This is further strengthened by the results of the polity score. It shows that countries
low on the polity score would pollute more, i.e. democratic countries significantly pollute
less compared to authoritarian countries. Waldhoff (2005) argues further that for a
democratic country the turning point is reached at a lower level of GDP per capita, but
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for an authoritarian country the cut-off point is much high. This reflects the fact that even
for a developing country, with a democratic polity, improvement of environmental
conditions would start earlier than any other authoritarian developing country. Therefore,
a case can be made from here that as and how a country democraticizes and urbanizes, it
would slowly become more environmentally aware.
However, Table 3 shows some changes in the earlier results. After including GDP
growth variable in the same model, the sign changes on the membership counter variable.
This new results imply that longer the countries are member they pollute more. This
might be due to the heavy emphasis of developing countries in the sample. The poor and
developing countries, although members of multilateral institutions tend to involve in
higher economic activities leading to higher pollution. The change in result might also be
due to multi-colleniarity. The economic growth variable, as coded in this paper, is
positively correlated with most of the other independent and control variables.
Nonetheless annex and the interaction term remain negatively and significantly related to
the dependent variable. Therefore, industrialized countries that are also member of the
UNFCCC would emit less. Another change in result is that percentage of urban
population loses its significance, but retains its directional relationship with the
dependent variable.
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Figure 2: CO2 emissions as predicted by the model
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1998

2000

Table 3: Effect of UNFCCC on CO2 emissions for all countries
1991-2000 (with GDP growth)

Variables

Co-efficients

z

.260
(.06)
.037
(.011)

4.50***

Membership
Membership counter

3.25**

Control Variables- International Regime Effect
Annex
Membership *
Annex

-.203
(.066)
-.333
(.074)

-3.08**
-4.46***

Domestic Regime Effects
.004
(.006)

0.67

GDP percapita

6.75e-06
(6.27e-06)

1.08

GDP percap-sq

-6.34e-11
(1.75e-10)

-0.36

Urban Population

-.001
(.0009)

-1.53

Industry

-.0010
(.0021)

-0.48

Polity

-.0077
(.0039)

-1.97**

Constant

.359
(.074)

4.85***

GDP growth

*** p< .01; ** p<.05; *p<.1
N = 659
Wald χ2 = 241.06***
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CONCLUSION AND FURTHER IMPLICATIONS
The principal explanatory variable for assessing the effectiveness of the UNFCCC did
show significant impact in bringing about desired changes in a world with the institution.
Again, to be borne in mind that economic development and a democratic polity are
potential facilitators in the process of attaining better environment.
However, these results should not be over exaggerated. International agreements, of all
kinds, have their own drawbacks. Although we find that UNFCCC has been quite
effective in reducing CO2 emissions in the member countries, one cannot ignore the fact
that it is only the beginning. Moreover, environment is considered to be a public good,
which would require more commitment on the part of the member nations to make them
effective in achieving its objective.
Weiss and Jacobson mention that in order for an international agreement to be
effective, it needs to account for the characteristic of the problem. In this paper, emphasis
was placed on the part of the actors in making this agreement effective. A close analysis
of the characteristics of the accord also warrants attention in order to keep it effective in
future.
Even for that matter national capacity of the actors was aggregated into two variables:
economic development and political system. It is to be borne in mind that in order to
implement the provisions of the agreement successfully, member countries will have to
develop their infrastructure base, promulgate legislation in support of those provisions,
and ensure stringent mechanisms of monitoring and investigation. Future research should
make an attempt to include these factors also within national capacity.
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Several things remain on the part of the framers of these agreements. An analysis of
these agreements reveals that to be effective the agreements should be able to overcome
two most important obstacles: political complexity and scientific uncertainty. On the
former, international efforts are needed to address the political aspect of global warming,
which requires close cooperation among the developed and the developing nations.
Scientific uncertainty can be overcome by channeling more research grants into this area.
Financial mechanism of the regimes/ agreements can be expected to have great impact
on its effectiveness, especially for developing countries, like the global environmental
fund (GEF) or the Montreal Fund under the Montreal Protocol. UNFCCC does not
provide anything even remotely similar to these to its members. As has been evident from
the findings here that member countries are attempting to fulfill the requirements of the
agreements, better provisions of the agreement, like financial help, can accelerate the
process further.
In addition to the above-mentioned provisions, the agreement should be able to respond
to non-compliance in a facilitative way. Sanctions are not considered to be an effective
mechanism in ensuring compliance, and in turn effectiveness. There should be
mechanisms both for reward and punishment in-built in the agreements to entice the
member countries.
In the absence of a supranational authority, institutions can play an extremely effective
role in directing states’ behavior. However, mindless negotiations of these multilateral
agreements will not get us far. Along with the framers, member countries also have a
distinct role to play. Keeping all these factors in mind, I conclude by reiterating my
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argument that along with economic development and democracy, participation in
multilateral agreements would bring about desired environmental benefits.
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APPENDIX 1: VARIABLE DESCRIPTION
Variables

Description

Dependent Variable

Percentage change of Carbon-di-oxide emission in
66 countries from 1991 to 2000, compared to 1990
as base year.

Explanatory variables
Membership

Ratifying UNFCCC; coded 0 until the year a
country ratifies and 1 thereafter

Membership counter

Measures number of years after each nation ratified
the convention

Control Variables
Annex

Coded as 1 for industrialized countries in Annex 1
category under UNFCCC and 0 otherwise

GDP per capita

GDP per capita for all nations (in 1995 USD)

GDP per capita sq

Squared transformation of GDP per capita, included
to capture non-linear relationship between income
and pollution as hypothesized by EKC

Urban Population

Percentage of population living in urban areas

Polity

Polity2 variable: Computed by subtracting AUTOC
from DEMOC; normal range polity scores are
imputed for coded "-77" and "-88" special polity
conditions, polities coded "-66" on the POLITY
variable are left blank

Industry

Percentage share of the industrial sector of a country
in its total GDP

Time counter

Numbered 1-10 for the 10 yrs time period for each
panel to capture trend of CO2 emissions

GDP growth

Percentage change in GDP compared to a base year
1990
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APPENDIX II: COUNTRIES AND YEAR OF RATIFICATION
CID
Annex I

Country

Year of Ratification

66
2
8
11
16
20
21
24
28
30
31
33
41
42
44
50
51
52
55
57
62

Austria
Belgium
Bulgaria
Canada
Denmark
Finland
France
Greece
Hungary
Ireland
Italy
Japan
Netherlands
New Zealand
Norway
Poland
Portugal
Romania
Spain
Sweden
United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland

1992
1996
1995
1992
1993
1994
1994
1994
1994
1994
1994
1993
1993
1993
1993
1994
1993
1994
1993
1993
1993

Argentina
Bangladesh
Benin
Bhutan
Bolivia
Botswana
Brazil
Burundi
Cameroon
Chile
China
Colombia
Costa Rica
Dominican Republic
Ecuador

1994
1994
1994
1995
1994
1994
1994
1997
1994
1994
1993
1995
1994
1998
1993

Non Annex 1
65
1
3
4
5
6
7
9
10
12
13
14
15
17
18
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CID
19
22
23
25
26
27
29
32
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
43
45
46
47
48
49
53
54
56
58
59
60
61
63
64

Country
El Salvador
Gambia
Ghana
Guatemala
Guinea
Honduras
India
Jamaica
Jordan
Madagascar
Malawi
Malaysia
Mali
Mauritius
Mexico
Nicaragua
Panama
Papua New Guinea
Paraguay
Peru
Philippines
Senegal
South Africa
Sri Lanka
Thailand
Trinidad & Tobago
Tunisia
Uganda
Uruguay
Vietnam
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Year of Ratification
1995
1994
1995
1995
1993
1995
1993
1995
1993
1999
1994
1994
1994
1992
1993
1995
1995
1993
1994
1993
1994
1994
1997
1993
1994
1994
1993
1993
1994
1994
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